基于演化博弈的油田企业节能减排意愿研究
The Study on Oil Field Enterprises’ Intention of Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Based on Evolutionary Game

作者: 丁 浩 , 代汝峰 , 荣 蓉 :中国石油大学,青岛;

关键词: 油田企业节能减排演化博弈Oil Field Enterprise Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Evolutionary Game

摘要:

节能减排已经成为国内外学者研究的热点,对于高耗能的石油产业来说,研究油田企业在政府干预下是否具有节能减排的意愿对节能减排工作的开展具有重要的意义。本文在传统博弈的基础上,使用具有非完全理性和非完全信息的演化博弈理论,将油田企业分为进行节能减排和不进行节能减排两大群体。通过对油田企业效益与政府管制程度参数的设定,建立动态复制方程,得出两个群体在整个石油行业中适应度的大小。对不同参数的比较得出结论:在政府管制下,油田企业节能减排的意愿与政府管制程度的大小有直接关系。政府通过制定合理的政策能够很好的引导油田企业进行节能减排工作的进行。

Energy conservation and emission reduction has become a hot spot in the study of domestic and foreign scholars. As a high energy consumption industry, it is important to study the control of government intervention, whether the oilfield enterprise take actions for energy conservation and emission reduction work. In this paper, on the basis of the traditional game, we use the bounded rationality and incomplete information game theory, and divide the oilfield enterprise into emissions reduction enterprise and the enterprises that don’t has the intention of energy conservation and emission reduction. Through the setting of the performance of oil field enterprises and the government control of the parameters, it establishes the dynamic replication equation, and it concludes that the size of the fitness of the two groups in the entire oil industry. With different parameters, it is concluded that oilfield enterprises’ intention of energy saving and emission reduction is directly related to the size of the degree of the government regulation. By formulating rational policy, the government can be a good guide for oilfield enterprises to develop the energy conservation and emissions reduction work.

文章引用: 丁 浩 , 代汝峰 , 荣 蓉 (2013) 基于演化博弈的油田企业节能减排意愿研究。 世界生态学, 2, 1-5. doi: 10.12677/IJE.2013.21001

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