股权结构、高管薪酬与公司业绩——来自电力行业上市公司的证据
Ownership Structure, Executive Officer’s Payment and Firm Performance——Evidence from Electric Industry Listed Firms

作者: 李世尧 :浙江省电力建设有限公司,宁波;

关键词: 股权结构高管薪酬公司业绩电力行业上市公司Ownership Structure Executive Officer’s Payment Firm Performance Electric Industry Listed Firms

摘要:

股权结构与高管薪酬是影响公司业绩的主要因素。文章在对相关文献进行深入研究的基础上提出理论假说,以ROA作为公司业绩的主要指标,运用面板估计方法对理论假设进行了实证检验。结果表明,股权集中度与公司业绩呈倒U型关系,高管持股比例与公司业绩呈现显著正相关;在国有控股的上市公司中,高管薪酬与公司业绩的正相关性不显著;第一大股东的持股比例与公司业绩之间存在较为显著的非线性关系,股权制衡有助于提高公司业绩的假说也得到证实。

Abstract: Ownership Structure and Executive Officer’s Payment are key factors to firm performance. This paper proposes theoretical hypotheses based on deep study on related material; it chooses ROA as the primary indicator of firm performance, and uses panel approach to empirically analyze through electric industry listed firms. The results show that: the relation between ownership concentration and performance is inverted U shaped, the proportion of executive ownership is positively related to firm performance; the relation between executive officer’s payment and firm performance is not significant in the state-controlled listed firms. In addition, FSP is non-linear relation with company performance; the hypothesis that the balances of stock ownership will help to improve firm performance has been confirmed.

文章引用: 李世尧 (2012) 股权结构、高管薪酬与公司业绩——来自电力行业上市公司的证据。 国际会计前沿, 1, 13-18. doi: 10.12677/FIA.2012.13003

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