付费模式与主体信用评级的关系研究
Payment Arrangement and Credit Rating in China

作者: 王汀汀 * , 符一尘 :中央财经大学金融学院,北京; 秦 丽 :四川省电力公司资阳供电公司人力资源部,四川 资阳;

关键词: 主体信用评级发行人付费投资人付费Credit Rating Paid by Issuers Paid by Investors

摘要:
2008年全球金融危机和2014年起国内频发的债券违约事件引起了市场对信用评级质量的担忧。本文梳理了国内外信用评级行业的发展历史和现状,并基于2016年信用评级样本,分析了不同付费模式下主体信用评级结果的差异。研究发现,对同样的主体,发行人付费模式的评级高于投资人付费时的评级;同时,发行人付费模式下,评级过程中财务指标的弹性较大。

Abstract: The financial crisis in 2008 and massive bond defaults since 2014 in China has attracted increas-ing attention to the quality of credit rating. Based on a sample of 2006, this paper analyzes the difference of credit rating between two kinds of payment arrangement. We find that, if it is paid by the issuing company, the rating results are higher on average, and the financial indicators of companies in the same rating level are more diversified. Our results mean that credit rating paid by investor could be more objective.

文章引用: 王汀汀 , 符一尘 , 秦 丽 (2017) 付费模式与主体信用评级的关系研究。 金融, 7, 287-298. doi: 10.12677/FIN.2017.75029

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