考虑排放的区域间拥挤收费博弈模型
Inter-Regional Congestion Pricing Model Considering Emissions

作者: 檀朝武 :上海海事大学,上海;

关键词: 拥挤收费竞争社会福利Congestion Pricing Competition Social Welfare

摘要:
本文使用双层模型对区域间拥挤收费的博弈行为进行了建模分析,模型上层为管理者考虑区域总体福利的模型,下层为用户在交通网络中的交通分配模型。然后通过竞争与合作的博弈理论进行了分析。结果表明,竞争下的区域间拥挤收费相比合作时社会总福利有一定的减少,但相比不收费时,竞争与合作下的收费均能达到一定的收益。

Abstract: This paper analyzes the game behavior of inter-regional congestion pricing using a two-level model; the upper-level is the model of the overall welfare of the region; the lower-level is the traffic distribution model in the traffic network. Then the results are analyzed by using the game theory. The results show that the total social welfare under competition is superior to the total welfare under cooperation, but it can achieve certain benefits comparing with the situation of not charging.

文章引用: 檀朝武 (2017) 考虑排放的区域间拥挤收费博弈模型。 管理科学与工程, 6, 124-131. doi: 10.12677/MSE.2017.63015

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