基于参与主体利益博弈视角的城乡建设用地配置内在动力探讨
Study on the Internal Driving Forces on Allocation of Urban and Rural Construction Land—Based on the View of the Benefit Games among the Participants

作者: 蔡国立 :华中农业大学土地管理学院,湖北 武汉;惠州市杰诚工程咨询有限公司,广东 惠州; 胡银根 :华中农业大学土地管理学院,湖北 武汉;

关键词: 城乡建设用地配置内在动力参与主体博弈分析Allocation of Urban-Rural Construction Land the Internal Driving Forces the Participants the Benefit Game Analysis

摘要:
研究目的:本文从地方政府、企业和农民三个参与主体的利益博弈视角探讨城乡建设用地配置的内在动力,有利于促进建设用地优化配置。研究方法:成本效益法,博弈分析法。研究结果:现有的征地、农村土地整治和信息不对称市场交易等三种不同城乡建设用地配置途径,涉及到地方政府、农民与用地企业等不同利益主体及其成本效益,采用成本效益法与博弈分析法进行系统分析。研究结论:土地经济供给的稀缺性决定了不同主体间的利益冲突必然存在,建设用地配置的结果取决于各参与主体在整个过程中所扮演的角色及其利益选择。同时,可以得出以下结论:在征地途径下,提高农民土地权利的保护意识和政府违规的成本能够有效遏制政府通过压低征地补偿牟利的冲动。在农村土地整治途径下,当没有企业参与时,政府与农民的博弈结果具有不确定性。政府更愿意选择提供优惠政策,由企业主导实施,在这种情况下,企业与农民的博弈没有纯策略纳什均衡,博弈结果取决于农民的监督成本、企业违规可能带来的成本节约以及违规处罚的力度。在市场配置途径下,由于信息不对称的存在,企业可能选择不公平交易而使农民利益受损,这意味着城乡建设用地的市场配置离不开政府的有效监管,以提高企业违规的成本,规范企业的市场行为。

Abstract: Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the internal driving forces in order to optimize the allocation of urban-rural construction land. The paper analyzes the issues from the view of the benefit games among the participants (local government, enterprises and farmers). Methods: The cost-benefit and the game analysis methods are used in the paper. Results: The results of this paper show that the different allocation ways of urban-rural construction land, which includes the land expropriation, the rural land rearrangement and the trade in an asymmetric information market, involve the different participants and their cost benefit including the local government, enterprises and farmers, based on the cost-benefit and the game analysis methods. Conclusion: The paper concludes that the scarcity of land economic supply leads to the interest conflict among the participants, and the results of the allocation of urban-rural construction depend on their different roles and the choice of benefit in the allocation process. At the same time, the following conclusions can be made: In the way of land expropriation, enhancing farmers' consciousness of protecting their land rights as well as governments' cost of violation can effectively curb governments’ motive of seeking profit by depressing land compensation. In the way of rural land remediation, when no companies participate, the game outcome of the government and the farmers is uncertain. Governments prefer to provide preferential policies implemented by the business-led. However, in this case, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and the game outcome depends on monitoring costs of farmers, the possible cost savings and intensity of penalties for non-com- pliance. In the way of market allocation, due to the presence of asymmetric information, companies may choose to damage the interests of farmers leaving the fair trade. This means that government’s regulation is needed in the course of land market transactions to raise the cost of violations and standardize the market behavior of the business.

文章引用: 蔡国立 , 胡银根 (2016) 基于参与主体利益博弈视角的城乡建设用地配置内在动力探讨。 城镇化与集约用地, 4, 19-29. doi: 10.12677/ULU.2016.43003

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