基于演化博弈的合作进化研究综述
Evolution of Cooperation Based on Evolutionary Game: A Comprehensive Review

作者: 张耀峰 :湖北经济学院统计学院,湖北 武汉;

关键词: 演化博弈合作进化复杂网络仿真Evolutionary Game Evolution of Cooperation Complex Networks Simulation

摘要: 合作的进化是人类社会演化过程中表现出的重要机制。以演化博弈为理论框架,结合计算机仿真技术分析人类合作行为,为合作进化研究提供了新的视角。为反映合作进化的研究进展,梳理了基于演化博弈的合作进化研究的相关文献。首先,给出了合作进化研究中常用的演化博弈模型,然后总结了促进合作进化的主要机制,最后归纳了影响合作进化的重要因素。在对已有研究综述的基础上,分析了已有研究的不足并进行了展望。

Abstract: Evolution of cooperation is an important mechanism in social evolution process. Evolutionary game theory and computer simulation technology provide a new perspective for analyzing cooperative behavior of human. To reflect the research progress of evolution of cooperation, we reviewed literatures of cooperative evolution based on evolutionary game. Firstly, we present several evolutionary game models used in the study of evolution of cooperation. And then, main mechanisms of promoting cooperation level are summarized. Finally, important factors influences the evolution of cooperation are inducted. Based on the review of research status, further analysis on the existed problems and shortcomings is made and some perspectives on the development trends of future research are provided.

文章引用: 张耀峰 (2016) 基于演化博弈的合作进化研究综述。 管理科学与工程, 5, 113-126. doi: 10.12677/MSE.2016.53013

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