Vol.4 No.6 (December 2014)
Study on the Manipulation Effect of CEO Power on Managerial Compensation Dispersion: A Literature Review
Existing studies have found that the traditional principal-agent theory has been unable to explain the reality of managerial compensation dispersion issues effectively, so scholars have to introduce a new theoretical perspective to study the decision mechanism of managerial compensation dis-persion. As the result of interdisciplinary and theoretical integration, the study based on CEO power (managerial discretion) perspective has become the mainstream of the decision mechanism of managerial compensation dispersion. It has integrated closely core ideas of three theory, respectively corporate governance theory, strategic management theory and human resources management theory, thus it is of both prospective and inherited characteristics. Under this back-ground, the paper reviews the history progress and the status quo of the literature on Managerial Compensation Dispersion, which mainly includes two sub-dimensions, i.e. Pay Gap between ex-ecutives-employees and Pay Gap among top executives, from the perspective of CEO power Theory. Results of the summarization show that: Firstly, studies on the manipulation effects of CEO power on Pay Gap between executives-employees reach three conclusions respectively: positive effect, inversed-U-shaped effect, or none effect at all; Secondly, the conclusions on the manipulation effects of CEO power on Pay Gap among top executives have nearly reached a consensus, i.e., there is a positive effect between the two. On the whole, the studies in this field have experienced a good developing progress moving from a relatively simple, extensive and single-faced state to a more complex, lean and multiple-faced state both in the research methods and research contents. Though such a change necessarily leads to many more effective study results than before, there are still many unreached tasks on this issue. In the future, scholars should try to move the study forward following the three trends, respectively, the trend of further deepening the insight, the trend of emphasizing comparative methods, and the trend of focusing on contingent perspective, by adopting the Sublation Spirit.
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